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Article III, section 2 of the Constitution of the United States
provides that "The judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies
. . .between Citizens of different States," and Congress has vested in
the federal district courts jurisdiction of civil suits between citizens of
different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000.1
Typically, a citizen of one state sues a citizen of another for injuries
sustained by the former and caused by the latter. There is no doubt
that diversity jurisdiction exists in such a case. But because judg-
ments are often higher in federal courts,2 and because judges, juries,
and procedures may be superior to those of the available state courts,3
injured plaintiffs and their lawyers often use every artifice at their
disposal to create federal jurisdiction where it would not otherwise
exist. The most frequently used device is the appointment of a repre-
sentative party whose citizenship differs from that of the defendant.
Although suit is then ostensibly between the representative and the
defendant, in reality the representative may be nothing more than a
nominal party with neither duties nor interest. Thus, if one citizen
kills another citizen of the same state and a citizen of a different state
is appointed to administer the estate, there may or may not be sufficient
diversity of citizenship between the parties to sustain federal juris-
diction.4 Similarly, when a minor and an adult, citizens of the same
state, run into each other on the highway the minor may have a
guardian from a different state appointed to sue on his behalf. As
their workload increases, federal courts are looking with a new per-
spective at cases where diversity is "manufactured," hoping to relieve
the federal judiciary of the burden of hearing cases which, beyond their
mere form, are essentially local actions that should be tried in state
tribunals.
A. Diversity Jurisdiction and Its Historical Limitations
During the struggle for ratification of the Federal Constitution,
the Federalists supported the diversity clause out of fear that foreign '
128 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).
2 An orphans' court judge in Philadelphia appointed a fact-finding commission to
determine the advantages offered by federal courts before appointing an out-of-state
guardian. The findings were that there is a better chance of obtaining and sustaining
a higher verdict in the federal courts than in state tribunals. Kaufmann Estate, 87
Pa. D. & C. 401, 404 (Phila. Orphans' Ct. 1954).
3 ALI STUDY OF THE DIvisioN OF JURIsDIcTzI BErwEE STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS, PART I, at 48 (Official Draft 1965).
4 The discussion throughout this paper assumes that the issue presented is one
of statutory construction, and not of congressional power in a situation where Congress
deemed it advisable to reach the constitutional limits of diversity jurisdiction.
5 As used in this Comment, the word "foreign" means a litigant not a citizen of the
forum state.
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litigants would be subjected to discrimination by the courts, juries,6
and legislatures of forum states.7 Anti-Federalists feared that un-
bridled access to federal courts might result in less competent decisions
on state law,' and, furthermore, might emasculate the state judiciary'
in cases where there was no danger of prejudice. Congress reacted to
these latter fears in the Judiciary Act of 1789 by limiting federal
diversity jurisdiction,"° particularly in the anti-assignment provision:
No district court shall have cognizance of any suit (except
upon foreign bills of exchange) to recover upon any promis-
sory note or other chose in action in favor of any assignee,
or of any subsequent holder if such instrument be payable to
bearer and be not made by any corporation, unless such suit
might have been prosecuted in such court to recover upon
said note or other chose in action if no assignment had been
made."
This provision worked effectively as a limitation on federal juris-
diction, since jurisdiction in suits by assignees was narrowly confined,
6 See Ynterna & Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. PA.
L. REV. 869, 876 n.13, 870 n.1, 871 n.1 (1931).
7See Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV.
483 (1928). As James Wilson brooded in the Pennsylvania Convention:
[H]ow a merchant must feel to have his property lay at the mercy of the
laws of Rhode Island? I ask further, how will a creditor feel who has debts
at the mercy of tender laws in other states?
THE DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS IN CONVENTION ON THE ADoP-
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 282 (J. Elliot ed. 1830). Alexander Hamilton
believed that diversity jurisdiction was necessary to preserve the privileges and
immunities guaranteed by the Constitution. THE FEDERALIST No. 80 at 588-90 (John
C. Hamilton ed. 1875). Contra, Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REv. 49, 82 (1923).
s The ablest expression of the belief that diversity jurisdiction was unnecessary
came from Richard Henry Lee in his LETTERS OF A FEDERAL FARMER:
[E]xcept paper money and tender laws, which are wisely guarded against in
the proposed constitution; justice may be obtained in these [state] courts on
reasonable terms; they must be more competent to proper decisions on the
law of their respective states, than the federal courts can possibly be. I do
not, in any point of view, see the need of opening a new jurisdiction in these
causes ....
PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 277, 307 (P. Ford ed. 1888).
9 Patrick Henry foresaw the doom of state courts:
I see arising out of that paper, a tribunal, that is to be recurred to in all cases,
when the destruction of the state judiciaries shall happen; and from the exten-
sive jurisdiction of these paramount courts, the state courts will soon be
annihilated.
3 THE DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS IN CONVENTION ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 397 (J. Elliot ed. 1830).
10 Congress imposed a monetary jurisdictional limitation as a safeguard against
forcing a party to travel great distances over a trivial claim. See 3 THE DEBATES,
RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS IN CONVENTION ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 131 (J. Elliot ed. 1830).
11 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73. The impetus behind the anti-
assignment clause was the states' interest in protecting their legal tender laws as much
as their interest in protecting their judiciary. Friendly, Diversity Jurisdiction, supra
note 3, at 495-97, 503 n.102.
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and if the owner of the claim could sue in his own name, there was no
motive for transferring it to another to bring the action. 2
The assignee clause, because of its birth in protection of state
tender laws,' 3 was not merely a limitation on manufactured diversity,
but rather operated without regard to the legitimacy of the transfer
or the assignee's need for the protection of a federal court. The
problem of colorable transfers with the intention of creating a case
cognizable in federal court was still presented, though, in suits con-
cerning transfers not covered by the statute, 4 such as actions for the
recovery of real property.'5  The courts, however, created their own
standards to determine the validity of the claimed diversity:
[I]t was equally well settled that if the transfer was fictitious,
the assignor or grantor continuing to be the real party in
interest, and the plaintiff on record but a nominal or colorable
party, his name being used only for the purpose of juris-
diction, the suit would be essentially a controversy between
the assignor or grantor and the defendant, . . . and that the
jurisdiction of the court would be determined by their citizen-
ship rather than that of the nominal plaintiff.'
In 1875, Congress acted again to limit the diversity jurisdiction.
With existing statutory law preventing the use of assignments of
notes or choses in action to create federal jurisdiction, and with
judicially-created criteria insuring that only legitimate assignees in
areas not covered by the statute would be recognized for purposes of
diversity, Congress directed the circuit courts to dismiss any suit
at any time . . . that such suit does not really and substan-
tially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the
jurisdiction of said circuit court, or the parties to said suit
12 Farmington v. Pillsbury, 114 U.S. 138, 142 (1885). Contra, Cohen & Tate,
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction by the Appointment of Representatives: Its Legality,
and Propriety, 1 VILL. L. REv. 201, 208 (1956), where the authors call the act of
1789 a "wooden rule" that was ineffective, requiring a new statute.
13 See note 11 supra.
14See B. R. CURTIS, JURISDICTION, PRACTICE, AND PECULIAR JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 155-59 (1896).
15 The exclusion of real estate assignments from the statute was greatly criticized:
This temporary prohibition which may be repealed at any time extends only
to prevent the assignment of "les choses en action," or in plain English, to
demands of a personal nature such as money due on bonds ... and ... there-
fore suits may be immediately instituted in the Federal Court for all the
uncontroverted land in Pennsylvania, or any other State, by merely borrowing
the name of a friend in another State, to bring the suit, which as above
observed, may be done by a mock assignment of the claim.
Independent Gazeteer (Phila.), Sept. 9, 1789, cited in Warren, New Light on the
History of the Federal Aidiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 80 & n.73 (1924).
16 Farmington v. Pillsbury, 114 U.S. 138, 143 (1885) (summary of pre-1875
law). See Maxwell's Lessee v. Levy, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 380 (C.C.D.Pa. 1797).
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have been improperly or collusively made or joined, . . . for
the purpose of creating a case cognizable or removable . 17
Congress thus included in its test for dismissal the same standard that
had been judicially created: if the plaintiff is a nominal, rather than
an interested party, the court will dismiss for lack of diversity if the
real party in interest is a citizen of the same state as the defendant.
In 1948, Congress revised and recodified the Judicial Code, re-
moving the anti-assignment clause and streamlining the phraseology
of the 1875 statute:
A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action
in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been
improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the juris-
diction of such court.'
8
When the codifiers changed the wording of the prior statute, they had
no intention of changing its meaning. As the revisers' note to section
1359 indicates:
Provision . . .for . . .an action not really and substantially
involving a dispute or controversy within the jurisdiction of
a district court, [was] omitted as unnecessary.19
B. Judicial Interpretation of Section 1359
In McSparran v. Weist2 ° and Esposito v. Emery,2 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit focused sharply on the
restrictive implications of section 1359 for diversity jurisdiction. In
an abrupt reversal of its past decisions, 2 the court held that the appoint-
ment of out of state guardians for the admitted purpose of creating
diversity to sue on behalf of their wards ' in federal court was "col-
17 Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 472. This was later incorporated
as § 37 of the Judicial Code of 1911, 28 U.S.C. § 80 (1940 ed.).
1828 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964). One of the major purposes of the revision was to rid
the code of the assignee clause, or what was left of it. For a discussion of the reasons
elimination was deemed necessary, see Comment, Chaos of Jurisdiction in the Federal
District Court, 35 ILL. L. REv. 566, 569 (1941), arguing that "the assignee clause in
its present form is a jumble of legislative jargon."
1928 U.S.C. §1359, at 5973-74 (1964).
20 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 37 U.S.L.W. 3439 (U.S. May 20,
1969).
21402 F.2d 878 (3d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
22 Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959) (minor child killed
by racing car, mother appointed administratrix, but resigned in favor of foreign
administrator after all functions of position completed except for bringing suit) ; Fallat
v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1955) (citizenship of guardian controlling for
diversity purposes, when daughter sues as general guardian for her incompetent
father); Jaffee v. Philadelphia Great W. Ry. Co., 180 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1950)
(stenographer in office of widow's attorneys appointed administratrix ad prosequendum
of deceased's estate; motive of appointment held unimportant).
23 In McSparran, the child was injured in an automobile accident; in Esposito,
the child was injured when a bank of school lockers fell on him.
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lusive" and "improper" under section 1359 and ordered both cases
dismissed.
Ten years earlier, in Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc.,4 Judge Biggs
had written for the same court:
The term "collusion" is a strong one. . [I]t indicates
"A secret agreement and cooperation for a fraudulent or
deceitful purpose; deceit; fraud." . . . Moreover, the word
"collusion" generally is employed to indicate an illegal agree-
ment or understanding between both sides of a litigation
rather than to an arrangement effected by one side of the
sort at bar. . . . The word "improperly" connotes clearly
impropriety.2 5
According to Judge Biggs, there could be no "collusion" unless both
parties were involved, and as long as there was a valid state court
appointment, nothing was done "improperly." Corabi quickly became
the authoritative interpretation of section 1359 in all jurisdictions
which considered the problem. 6
Many scholars felt that the intent of section 1359 had been
negated by Corabi and the cases following it.2 7  When the Third
24264 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959).
- Id. at 788. The 8th Circuit had previously established a similar definition of
"collusive", holding that as long as the plaintiffs did that which is lawful, there is
no collusion. Curb & Gutter Dist. No. 37 v. Parrish, 110 F.2d 902, 907-08 (8th
Cir. 1940).
26See Lang v. Elm City Constr. Co., 324 F.2d 235 (2d Cir.), aff'g 217 F. Supp.
873 (D. Conn. 1963) ; Stephan v. Marlin Firearms Co., 325 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), aff'g
per curiam 217 F. Supp. 880 (D. Conn.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 959 (1963) ; County
of Todd v. Loegering, 297 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1961) ; Meehan v. Central R.R. Co. of
New Jersey, 181 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Cf. Borror v. Sharon Steel Co.,
327 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1964).
Prior to 1968, only two cases had gone the other way. Cerr v. Akron-People's
Telephone Co., 219 F. 285 (N.D. Ohio 1914), held that the citizenship of a widow, and
not of the administrator of her husband's estate, was binding for determining diversity,
but it was overruled sub silentio by Harrison v. Love, 81 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1936),
in which the court upheld jurisdiction based on the citizenship of an administrator who
was appointed solely to create diversity. Martineau v. City of St. Paul, 172 F.2d 777
(8th Cir. 1949), held that the citizenship of the ward, rather than the guardian was
controlling. It has never been followed, however, and its authority has been eroded
by McCoy v. Blakely, 217 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1954), and County of Todd v. Loegering,
supra.
-7 See, e.g., 3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 17.05, at 165-66 (2d ed. 1967);
ALI STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS,
PART I, at 62-3 (Official Draft 1965). As part of its program to restructure the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, the American Law Institute has recommended:
An executor, or an administrator, or any person representing the estate of
a decedent or appointed pursuant to statute with authority to bring an action
because of the death of a decedent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of the
same state as the decedent; and a guardian, committee, or other like repre-
sentative of an infant or incompetent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of
the same state as the person represented.
Id., § 1301(b) (4), at 9.
The ALI proposal has met violent opposition from the American Trial Lawyers
Association, see Resolution of Board of Governors, American Trial Lawyers Associa-
tion, Sept. 29, 1968, and from the International Academy of Trial Lawyers, see
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Circuit adopted its definitions in Corabi, it opened the floodgates to a
multitude of manufactured diversity cases. An American Law Institute
study showed that more than twenty per cent of the sample cases in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1958-59 involved foreign
representative plaintiffs.2" At the same time in the Western District
of Pennsylvania, thirty-three cases were brought by the same adminis-
trator. 9  In 1968, one foreign citizen was the guardian in sixty-one
pending suits in the Eastern District.3
Under a narrow interpretation of section 1359, "collusively" could
be taken to refer to conduct of opposing parties who collaborate to
achieve results mutually desirable. Similarly, state court appointment
of a guardian would not be "improper" if "improper" is read to mean
impropriety. The legislative history and statutory development of
section 1359, however, point to a more liberal construction. As was
noted earlier,3 the draftsmen of the statutes ancestral to section 1359
incorporated the judicial standard for determining what suits must be
dismissed for lack of diversity. When it authorized the federal courts
to dismiss suits "collusively" or "improperly" brought, or those not
substantially within the jurisdiction of the court, Congress allowed
the courts to continue the test that they had created with respect to
assignments generally. Included within this test were the judicial
definitions of "collusive."
Judicial definition and use of the standard "collusive" began in
1797, with Maxfield's Lessee v. Levy,32 where Mr. Justice Iredell,
sitting on circuit dismissed an action in ejectment because land had
been transferred to the plaintiff in an attempt to lay a foundation for
jurisdiction. Although only the plaintiff's side was involved in the
transfer, Mr. Justice Iredell termed it "collusive" and dismissed the
suit on the ground that it was in reality one between citizens of the same
state. The court's opinion has been adopted and consistently followed
by the Supreme Court.3 3
Resolution of Board of Directors, International Academy of Trial Lawyers, August
6, 1966. For a detailed criticism of the overall ALI proposal, see Currie, The Federal
Courts and the American Law Institute, Part I, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1968). Currie,
however, approves this particular part of the proposal. Id. 15-18.
In his opinion in McSparran, Judge Freedman stated that there would be no need
for such legislation but for the interpretation of section 1359 in Corabi and similar
decisions. This may overemphasize the corrective power of the courts, but if the
test advocated below is adopted, many cases to which the proposed legislation is
directed would be covered.
28 ALI STUDY OF THE DIvIsIoN OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS, PART I, at 170-77 (Official Draft 1965).
29 Jamison v. Kammerer, 264 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1959).
30 McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 871 (3d Cir. 1968).
31 See text accompanying notes 16-19 supra.
324 U.S. (4 Dall.) 330 (C.C.D.Pa. 1797).
33 Farmington v. Pillsbury, 114 U.S. 138 (1885); Williams v. Nottawa, 104
U.S. 209, 211 (1881); see Barney v. Baltimore, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 280 (1867);
Jones v. League, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 76 (1855); Smith v. Kernochen, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 198, 216 (1849); McDonald v. Smalley, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 620, 624 (1828).
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Viewed with this historical perspective, Judge Freedman's broad-
ened definition of "collusive" in McSparran and Esposito is correct:
[A] nominal party designated simply for the purpose of
creating diversity of citizenship, who has no real or substantial
interest in the dispute or controversy is improperly or col-
lusively named.3 4
Contrary interpretations of section 1359 emasculate it, depriving the
restriction of most of its utility. As the Fifth Circuit has stated,
Indeed, when litigants can achieve diversity by such simple
devices as assignment to a nonresident administrator, it is
hard to imagine why they would ever resort to fraud or
deceit, actual impropriety, or collusion with the other side."'
This distinction between "nominal parties" and those with "sub-
stantial interest in the dispute" is critical not only in the application
of the definition of "collusive," but also in distinguishing these cases
from a long line of strong precedents holding that the citizenship of
the representative party is controlling for diversity purposes:3
34 McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 873 (3d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
35Caribbean Mills, Inc., v. Kramer, 392 F.2d 387, 393 (5th Cir. 1968), aff'd,
37 U.S.L.W. 4391 (U.S. May 5, 1969). Caribbean Mills, a Haitian corporation, agreed
to buy stock from a finance company. The installments were not paid, and the finance
company sold its interest under the contract to Kramer, a Texas attorney, for $1.
Kramer then reassigned 95% of his interest back to the finance company. The
court held this "collusive" and "improper" under § 1359. In many ways this is an
easier case than McSparran and Esposito: because this type of assignment has been
prohibited since 1789, see text accompanying note 11 supra, and § 1359 specifically
alludes to fraudulent assignments, whereas it makes no specific mention of guardians.
36 The courts have looked to the citizenship of executors, rather than testators,
Childress v. Emory, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 642 (1823); Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux,
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 306, 308 (1808); administrators, rather than decedents, Rice v.
Houston, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 66 (1871); Kerrigon's Estate v. Joseph Seagram &
Sons, 199 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1952); and trustees, rather than beneficiaries, Dodge
v. Tulleys, 144 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1892); Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.)
172 (1870). Cf. Bullard v. City of Cisco, 290 U.S. 179 (1933). An exception to the
general rule was developed where the trustee's name is required to be used, but he
has no interest in the suit. McNutt v. Bland, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 9 (1844). In
similar cases, the courts looked to the citizenship of subrogees, New Orleans v.
Gaines Adm'r, 138 U.S. 595 (1891) and receivers, ignoring the citizenship of the
corporation under receivership, Brisenden v. Chamberlain, 53 F. 307, 310 (D. S.C.
1892).
As Judge Freedman points out, the issue in these cases was simply whose
citizenship is controlling for purposes of diversity. Section 1359 was not involved,
nor were there allegations of "collusive" or "improper" action by the plaintiff.
McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 871 (3d Cir. 1968).
In his dissenting opinion in Esposito, Judge Biggs was disturbed by the language
of the Supreme Court in Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183, 189
(1931) :
[I]t is clear that the motive or purpose that actuated any or all of these
parties in procuring a lawful and valid appointment is immaterial upon the
question of identity in diversity of citizenship. To go behind the decree of
the probate court would be collaterally to attack it ....
Mecom is inapposite, however, since it involved an attempt to avoid diversity rather
than to create it and § 1359 was not applicable.
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[C]ases in which a straw or nominal fiduciary is appointed
to create diversity stand on totally different ground than those
in which the courts are simply concerned with the general
question whether the citizenship of the personal representative
or his ward or beneficiary should be the test of diversity
jurisdiction. In cases of "manufactured" diversity juris-
diction there is brought into play the question of the ap-
plicability of 28 U.S.C. § 1359..... .7
C. A Proposed Standard
In neither McSparran nor Esposito did the court lay down
specific guidelines to distinguish between "nominal parties" and those
with a "substantial interest." Because the parties in both cases ad-
mitted that the sole purpose in the appointment of the guardian was to
create diversity jurisdiction,3" Judge Freedman was not forced to state
general rules. This Comment proposes that a party be considered
merely nominal and without a substantial interest when (1) there was
no need for his appointment except for the "need" to create diversity of
citizenship, 9 and (2) he has no substantial duties in his representative
capacity other than bringing the suit and administering any proceeds
from it.4" If diversity is based on the citizenship of such a guardian
or representative, the suit should be dismissed.4' This standard is con-
sistent with earlier Supreme Court cases that look to the citizenship
of the representative who has substantial duties to perform.42
For example, if the parents of a minor child are killed in an auto-
mobile accident, a guardian will usually have to be appointed to care
for the child. If the guardian sues on the child's behalf, the court
should ignore the fact that part of the motivation behind his appoint-
Judge Biggs infers that under Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
the federal courts might be bound to accept the state court appointment. But, as
Judge Freedman explains, dismissal of a suit does not mean rejection of the appoint-
ment. It only means that the federal courts have their own test for jurisdiction.
As the Supreme Court stated in Caribbean Mills, Inc. v. Kramer, 37 U.S.L.W. 4391,
4393 (U.S. May 5, 1969):
The existence of federal jurisdiction is a matter of federal, not state, law.
[citation omitted] Nothing in the language or legislative history of § 1359
suggests that an assignment cannot be "improperly or collusively made" even
though binding under state law, and this court has several times held to
the contrary ....
37 McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 871 (3d Cir. 1968).
38 Id. at 869.
39 The burden of proof as to jurisdiction falls on the party claiming diversity.
McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936).
40 Substantial duties will vary in meaning according to the type of representative
involved. In McSparran, the court indicated it was looking to an active management
of the property of the ward. 402 F. 2d at 873.
41 Of course, any case which falls within the old restricted interpretation of
"improper or collusive" should also be dismissed.
42 See note 36 supra.
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ment may have been that he was a citizen of a different state than the
child and the prospective defendant. There was a need for the appoint-
ment and the desire to create diversity only affected the particular person
chosen. On the other hand, if a child is injured in an automobile
accident, his still-living parents should not be able to create diversity
jurisdiction by the appointment of an out-of-state guardian with no
other substantial duties.' They can sue on their child's behalf, and
there is no need for the appointment but for the desire to manufacture
diversity.
This standard should not be confined to guardianship cases. It
can properly be applied to suits brought by executors, administrators,
trustees, subrogees, and receivers.
An executor must be named for every testamentary disposition.
Although a specific executor may be named in order to create a potential
out-of-state litigant, there is nevertheless a need for the appointment in
every case. Thus the executor is always a party with a substantial
interest. The testator's purpose in selecting this particular executor is
not relevant.
Similarly, adminstrators appointed to administer the entire estate
of the deceased would not be disqualified by the proposed test from
suing in federal court. On the other hand, if the administrator is ap-
pointed solely for the purpose of a particular litigation and has no
other substantial duties-as was the case in Corabi v. Auto Racing,
Inc.,44 where the out-of-state administrator had been appointed only
after all affairs of the estate were completed by the deceased child's
mother-the suit should be dismissed. There would have been no
need for the out-of-state appointment but for the desire to manufacture
diversity.
Inter vivos trustees who have been appointed prior to suit, and
whose functions include active management of a trust fund will not be
prevented from suing in federal court by the proposed standard. Be-
cause state law will not recognize a trust without a corpus, it is
unlikely that a trustee will not have substantial management duties to
perform. Although the settlor may have included specific property in
the corpus in order to transfer to the trustee a cause of action related
to that property, as long as he is actively managing the trust, the courts
should consider him a party with a substantial interest. In these rare
cases, where there are no duties, and the state insists on recognizing
the representative as a trustee, the court should dismiss.
Without dissent, diversity jurisdiction has been sustained when
the citizenship of a plaintiff's subrogee and the defendant were diverse,
43 It appears that a state court will appoint a guardian merely to allow an injured
youth and his parents to sue in federal court. See Kaufmann Estate, 87 Pa. D. & C.
401 (Phila. Orphans' Ct. 1954).
44264 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1959), discussed in text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
1969]
760 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
although the citizenship of the primary claimant was identical to that
of the defendant.4 5  The proposed rule would not change this. The
most familiar example of the subrogation problem arises in the context
of liability insurance. An insurance company paying compensation
for a claim is thereby subrogated to the rights of the insured against
the wrongdoer. In such cases, courts have properly held that the
insurance company had a substantial interest in suing to recover its
money." Although the citizenship of insurance companies for diversity
purposes is now regulated by statute,4 7 the traditional acceptance of the
citizenship of the subrogee for diversity should be carried over to all
cases of subrogation.
Finally, the citizenship of a receiver would continue to be deter-
minative in diversity cases: there is a need for the appointment aside
from obtaining a plaintiff who can sue in a federal forum. Of course,
if one receiver were substituted for another solely for the purpose of
creating jurisdiction and he were not given other substantial duties,
the proposed test would require dismissal.48
D. An Alternative Test
A much broader standard for dismissal would be a but-for test
standing alone, whether or not the representative had other substantial
duties to perform. Before McSparran and Esposito, the Third Circuit
had felt constricted in its definition of "improper" by Mecorn v. Fitzsim-
mons Drilling Co.,49 where the Supreme Court had indicated that a
federal court could not challenge the validity of a state court appoint-
ment. But in McSparran, the Third Circuit recognized that refusal
to recognize as controlling for diversity purposes the citizenship of a
state-appointed guardian is not a collateral attack on the appointment
itself.5" Consequently, it is free to fashion a new definition of "im-
proper." Under the but-for test standing alone, a court would dismiss
45 New Orleans v. Gaines Adm'r, 138 U.S. 595 (1891); United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co. v. City of Asheville, 85 F.2d 966, 971-72 (4th Cir. 1936); Staples v.
Central Surety & Ins. Corp., 62 F.2d 650, 652 (10th Cir. 1932) ; American Surety Co.
v. Lewis State Bank, 58 F.2d 559, 560 (5th Cir. 1932); Clairbourne Parish School
Bd. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 40 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1930) ; Fidelity & Deposit Co.
v. Farmer's Bank, 44 F.2d 11, 15 (8th Cir. 1930); Palmer v. Oregon-Washington
R.R. & Nay. Co., 208 F. 666, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1913).
46 See cases cited note 45 supra.
4728 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1964).
48 If one representative is substituted for another for the purpose of establishing
diversity, but is also given substantial duties, the court could not dismiss. The
existence of the earlier representative shows the need for appointment, and the exist-
ence of substantial duties shows the party is not nominal. If substantial duties were
not given to the substituted representative, however, then he would be a nominal party
whose appointment could not be characterized as necessary except to create diversity,
and the suit should be dismissed.
49284 U.S. 183 (1931).
50 402 F.2d at 874. See note 36 supra.
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any suit where the plaintiff could not identify a reasonable purpose for
the appointment other than to create diversity.
Under a reasonable purpose standard, a court might well decide
that it is more reasonable to expect the appointment of an out-of-stater
to be made in cases involving corporate receivers or trustees. When
a corporation goes into bankruptcy, sound business judgment may
dictate that a local receiver be appointed to administer local property.
Thus, the citizenship of the corporation, which is deemed to be its
state of incorporation and its principal place of business,5 will not
necessarily be the same as the citizenship of the receiver since the
corporation may own property in other states. Similarly, it would
not be strange to find an out-of-state trustee appointed to administer
property located close to his domicile. As applied to executors, the
reasonable purpose test would probably result in upholding the created
diversity. In order to find that the decedent's purpose in choosing a
specific executor was to create diversity, one would have to find that
the decedent was contemplating a lawsuit that would be brought after
his death and that he desired such a suit to be brought in federal
court. In addition, one would have to find that the decedent had a
specific defendant in mind; otherwise, he would not have known what
executor to name. Cases where such findings could be made would
indeed be rare.
On the other hand, when administrators or guardians are in-
volved a court may scrutinize more closely the reasons for appointment.
Absence of the appointee from the jurisdiction limits the appointing
court's control over him. Since the primary beneficaries of a cause
of action brought by an administrator will normally be the immediate
family of the deceased, if they were living with him, the burden of
showing a reasonable purpose for the appointment of a distant repre-
sentative would be greater. An out-of-state guardian would also bear
a heavier burden in showing why a citizen from a different state than
the ward was chosen. Functionally, such an approach makes sense,
since state courts and juries are less likely to view the plaintiff as an
"outsider" when he represents persons who are, or were, citizens of the
forum state. When receivers or trustees are plaintiffs, however, a
state court or jury is more likely to envision an out-of-state entity, and
the protection offered by diversity jurisdiction should be more
accessible.
Nevertheless, this alternative, reasonable purpose standard should
be rejected. The administrative difficulties in determining intent would
clearly seem to outweigh any advantages the alternative test may
possess, especially because under the alternative test the courts would
be forced to make the determination in every case in which a repre-
sentative party had been appointed, even where there had been an
obvious need for the appointment or where the appointee had sub-
5128 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1964).
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stantial duties to perform. 2 Judge Biggs' criticism increases in force
if one imagines the reasonable purpose standard being used alone:
[W]ould not the United States district court in almost every
case, at its peril and at the peril of the litigants, have to deter-
mine what the purpose, "naked", "primary", or otherwise,
which caused or prompted someone on behalf of some kind
of fiduciary to bring suit in the United States court? And
would this not require in almost every instance the taking of
evidence and an examination not of objective but of
subjective criteria, i.e., what was in the mind of the persons
or person who moved in Orphans' Court or any probate
tribunal to appoint an out-of-state executor or administrator.
. . . While purporting to abolish the "manufacture" of
diversity jurisdiction, the majority rule would elevate such
manufacturing to an art difficult to define and even more
difficult to combat.n3
CONCLUSION
The standard proposed in this Comment goes beyond the re-
stricted interpretation of section 1359 to distinguish between nominal
representatives and representatives with a substantial interest. Its
primary drawback is that it does not remove more suits from the
diversity jurisdiction. But it does have an overriding advantage over
the alternative test: difficult findings of fact needed to establish sub-
jective intent directly will usually not be required. The duties of the
appointee, and in some cases, the time of the appointment, would be
the most important factors. Although the alternative test would, at
least in theory, reach more suits, these could easily prove so difficult
to flush out that the courts would in the long run save more time and
effort using the test proposed.
This test is similar to that established by the Supreme Court where
corporate or private parties move from one state to another to create
diversity. Recognizing that a citizen can instantly transfer his citizen-
ship from one state to another,5 4 the Supreme Court has ruled that a
diversity suit should be dismissed only if the plaintiff had no intention
of acquiring a domicile or settled home in his new state, and moved
with the sole objective of availing himself of federal diversity juris-
diction. 5 Similarly, if a corporation has formed a subsidiary or
affiliated company in another state, transferring to it the property which
was involved in a cause of action, courts are to dismiss if the arrange-
52 If the proposed standard proves ineffective in the face of the ingenuity of the
bar, the but-for test standing alone or an entirely new statute may be the only answer.
53 402 F.2d at 882.




ment was made for no other purpose than to establish diversity." If
the new residence or the transfer of property is real, however, then
despite a motivation to create diversity, the court will not dismiss.
Thus, in Black and White Taxi and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow
Taxi and Transfer Co.,5 7 a Kentucky corporation organized a Tennessee
corporation to which it transferred all its assets, and dissolved the
Kentucky business. The new corporation brought a diversity suit in
federal court, and jurisdiction was upheld. In other words, when the
change of residence is real,5" the corporation or individual has given
up any protection that his citizenship in the state from which he came
might have afforded him, and is subjecting himself to an entirely new
complex of state laws. Fairness, the practical problems of a challenge
to his motives, and possibly the Constitution itself command that he
be treated like other citizens of his new state.
The treatment of representative parties in diversity cases should
be along the same lines. The fact that diversity of citizenship did not
exist between the underlying parties to the suit should not necessarily
be a bar to federal jurisdiction; as with the cases involving transfer of
residence, diversity may be created where it did not otherwise exist.
But the mere fact, without more, that a representative party has been
appointed with the requisite diversity of citizenship is not sufficient
foundation for federal diversity jurisdiction. The test proposed here
for continuing with or dismissing representative suits should lead to
the proper results.
5 6 Miller & Lux, Inc. v. East Side Canal & Irrigation Co., 211 U.S. 293 (1908);
Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327 (1895).
57276 U.S. 518 (1928).
68 As the court emphasized in McSparran, when it compared its dismissal to the
Supreme Court's handling of these corporate citizenship cases:
While the Court held that jurisdiction existed regardless of the motive of
management and shareholders of the corporation, it did so in the context of a
real transaction which had significance beyond establishment of diversity
jurisdiction.
402 F.2d at 875.
